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Abstract: Psychomotor experience can be based on what people predict they will experience, rather
than on sensory inputs. It has been argued that disconnects between human experience and sensory
inputs can be addressed better through further development of predictive processing theory. In this
paper, the scope of predictive processing theory is extended through three developments. First, by
going beyond previous studies that have encompassed embodied cognition but have not addressed
some fundamental aspects of psychomotor functioning. Second, by proposing a scientific basis for
explaining predictive processing that spans objective neuroscience and subjective experience. Third,
by providing an explanation of predictive processing that can be incorporated into the planning and
operation of systems involving robots and other new technologies. This is necessary because such
systems are becoming increasingly common and move us farther away from the hunter-gatherer
lifestyles within which our psychomotor functioning evolved. For example, beliefs that workplace
robots are threatening can generate anxiety, while wearing hardware, such as augmented reality
headsets and exoskeletons, can impede the natural functioning of psychomotor systems. The primary
contribution of the paper is the introduction of a new formulation of hierarchical predictive processing
that is focused on psychomotor functioning.
Keywords: active inference; critical realism; embodiment; experience; human–robot; pain; hierarchi-
cal predictive processing; predictive global neuronal workspace; psychomotor; Society 5.0
1. Introduction
Within predictive processing, perception is a Bayesian process that involves updating
prior beliefs into posterior beliefs in order to reduce prediction errors, in other words, to
reduce differences between what we expect to experience and what we do experience.
Empirical research by others has provided support for predictive processing. For exam-
ple, interactions between predictions, expectations, sensory inputs, and attention have
been found in research using functional magnetic resonance imaging [1]. Other empirical
studies deploying neuroimaging have observed neurology for prediction errors [2], while
separate empirical research using magneto-encephalography has found interactions be-
tween predictions and prediction errors [3]. In addition, empirical research by others using
magneto-encephalography has examined disruptions to hierarchical predictive processing
caused by sleep [4].
Prediction errors can be minimized by changing our expectations and/or changing
our actions, including changing what we pay attention to and/or changing what we do.
Notably, changes to reduce prediction errors may not improve wellbeing. For example,
chronic ill health can be influenced more by changes to expectations and attention than
by sensory evidence [5,6]. Apropos, findings from empirical research by others indicate
that pain experience can be predicted in Bayesian terms [7]. Furthermore, findings from
empirical research by others have indicated that symptoms can reflect the relative predom-
inance of either prior beliefs or sensory inputs with predictive processing being influenced
by personal characteristics [8].
In this paper, predictive processing was addressed from the point-of-view of planning
and operating systems involving humans interacting with robots and wearing technologies
such as augmented reality headsets and exoskeletons. This is necessary because such
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systems are becoming increasingly common and move us farther away from the hunter-
gatherer lifestyles within which our psychomotor functioning evolved [9]. For example,
beliefs that workplace robots are threatening can generate anxiety and fear, while the use
of hardware, such as augmented reality headsets and wearable exoskeletons, can impede
the natural functioning of psychomotor systems [10].
In particular, the purpose of this paper was to expand the scope of predictive process-
ing theory in three ways. First, by going beyond previous studies that have encompassed
embodied cognition but have not addressed some fundamental aspects of psychomotor
functioning. Second, by proposing a scientific basis for explaining predictive processing
that spans objective neuroscience and subjective experience. Third, by providing an expla-
nation of predictive processing that can be incorporated into the planning and operation of
systems involving robots and other new technologies. Throughout the remainder of this
paper, such systems are referred to as human–robot systems.
To fulfil this purpose, the paper proceeds in seven further sections. In Section 2, the
need to incorporate psychomotor predictive processing in the planning and operation
of human–robot systems is explained. In Section 3, it is explained why the critical re-
alist philosophy of science provides a better basis for framing psychomotor predictive
processing than either the positivist or anti-positivist philosophies of science. In Section
4, it is explained that predictive global neuronal workspace (PGNW) [11] is the theory
that is most compatible with critical realist framing of psychomotor predictive processing.
PGNW combines predictive processing with the global neuronal workspace explanation
of consciousness, the support for which can be found in more than a decade of empirical
research by others using, for example, electroencephalography [12]. In Section 5, a critical
realist framing is described with two examples. In Section 6, a critical realist framing of
PGNW is related to psychomotor experience. In Section 7, a new formulation of hierarchical
predictive processing is proposed that is focused on psychomotor functioning. In addition,
challenges and opportunities are discussed for including the consideration of hierarchical
psychomotor predictive processing in the planning and operation of human–robot sys-
tems. In Section 8, principal contributions are stated and directions for further research are
proposed. Overall, this paper concerns theory building, principally, by bringing together
the critical realist philosophy of science and PGNW in a new formulation of hierarchical
predictive processing that is focused on psychomotor functioning. Although this theory
building does not include new primary data from experiments, extensive reference is made
to empirical research by others. In addition, the limitations of previous research and the
need for further research are discussed in Sections 6 and 8, respectively.
2. Need for Predictive Processing Formulation Focused on Psychomotor Functioning
New technologies bring an increasing variety and frequency of novel sensations
that are far from those that human psychomotor functioning evolved to deal with [9,13].
For example, exoskeletons are mechanical frameworks that humans can wear to increase
their strength and endurance beyond our evolved psychomotor limits. However, the
wearing of exoskeletons restricts the range of human motion, such as three-dimensional
rotational movements that are typically involved in lifting. At the same time, the wearing
of exoskeletons introduces multiple new and unpredictable loads to the musculoskeletal
systems. Hence, the wearing of exoskeletons can have negative effects on fascia system
functioning. The fascia system comprises bands and sheets of connective tissue beneath the
skin. It attaches, stabilizes, encloses, and separates muscles. Importantly, the fascia system
is our largest sensory organ for interoception, nociception, and proprioception. Hence,
exoskeletons can involve immediately apparent novel sensations, for example, from lifting
while wearing a mechanical framework. Then, over time, wearing exoskeletons could
contribute to unpredictable novel sensations through negative unintended changes to
interoception, nociception, and proprioception. Here, it is important to note that wearable
exoskeletons can be used in conjunction with other new technologies that introduce further
sources of novel sensations, such as augmented reality headsets and mobile robotics [10,14].
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Moreover, although fabricating new technologies involves more extraction of finite
natural resources from the lithosphere and more disruption to the biosphere [15], the
deployment of robots, etc. is increasing in many sectors [16,17]. Yet, the anticipation of
widespread full automation is now being revised to the planning and operation of human–
robot systems in what has been described as Society 5.0 [18]. This term refers to the fifth
stage of technology-enabled development since the beginning of the industrial revolution,
in which the need for technologies to complement and enhance human capabilities is
emphasized [19]. In particular, rather than aiming for full automation, it is recognized that
the so-called human touch is important in many endeavors [20], including in production
work [21] and in healthcare [22].
This technology-enabled movement toward so-called Society 5.0 encompasses the
consideration of human beliefs, including ethics [23]. Human ethical behavior is often a
psychomotor phenomenon within which most people will typically adhere to sociocultural
ethical practice unless overloaded by stress [24,25], for example, from resource depletion
and time pressure [26,27]. Accordingly, from an optimistic perspective, human–robot
systems have the potential to facilitate ethical behavior if robots reduce human stress from
workload and time pressure. On the other hand, the introduction of robots can cause human
stress to increase. For example, as well as anxieties about robots taking jobs [28]; there are
also anxieties about robots developing dangerous superintelligence; about robots harboring
malicious intrinsic motivations and about robots enacting unfavorable intentions [29–32].
Notably, human anxiety about perceived threats can contribute to humans underestimating
their proximity [33] and overestimating the pain that they could cause [34]. Moreover,
psychological stress from anxiety can contribute to people becoming accident-prone [35].
Hence, human–robot systems need to be planned and operated to minimize the
potential for increasing human stress. Here, it is important to note that different people
have different propensities for experiences of anxiety and related pain [36–38]. Apropos,
the planning and operation of human–robot systems need to take into account psychomotor
differences in a wide variety of settings that could contribute to unintended consequences,
including increased human stress, anxiety, and pain. This is of the utmost importance
because short-term stress, anxiety, and pain can contribute to long-term disorders of
consciousness, such as the experience of chronic symptoms without pathophysiological
disruption. In other words, chronic ill health that is far more extensive than potential
initial causes, i.e., chronic medically unexplained symptoms [5,6,39,40]. Accordingly, it is
important to include consideration of predictive processing in the planning and operation
of human–robot systems. In particular, hierarchical predictive processing provides a
physics of life perspective for psychomotor experience, which encompasses novel sensory
inputs being followed by the development of negative expectations, and then the avoidance
of movement and other sources of sensory inputs that are expected to be negative [41,42].
The consideration of predictive processing should be carried out with methods that are
consistent with the preference of science and practice for parsimony and simplicity [43–47].
Accordingly, methods should be informed by a scientific theory that provides a simple
predictive framework for psychomotor experience. This should be a scientific theory
that is focused upon the embodied action that is inherent in psychomotor functioning.
Furthermore, it should be compatible with the parsimonious simple methods used in
engineering design and operations management. Typically, this involves formats such as
tables within methodologies that provide structured guidance for dealing with otherwise
challenging issues. For example, design methodologies can include tables for function
analyses, quality function deployment, and evaluating alternatives [48].
3. Critical Realist Philosophy of Science
There is debate about different levels and types of consciousness [49–54]. These can
be analyzed in terms of, for example, physical-neurobiological, functional, informational-
computational, representationalist, and phenomenological [55]. Underlying debate about
levels and types of consciousness is the difficulty of bringing together opposing philoso-
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phies of science: positivism and anti-positivism, for example, positivist neuroscience data
and anti-positivist interpretivist descriptions. Critical realism is a philosophy of science that
bridges positivism and anti-positivism [56], and it is used in the framing of psychomotor
experience because of its advantages compared to positivism and anti-positivism [57,58]. In
particular, unlike positivism’s general laws in flat conjunctions of cause and effect, critical
realism posits a three-layered stratification of causation encompassing the why, how, and
what of experience. Furthermore, unlike anti-positivism within which it is claimed that
explanations can provide only subjective impressions of unique human experiences, critical
realism provides why-how-what explanations of causation that are generalizable within
particular enabling contexts [59–61].
Critical realist context-dependent causation (i.e., why) involves generative causal
mechanisms comprising tendencies and powers [62,63]. Tendencies are potentials that are
typical to a category. For example, many people can be anxious occasionally but people
within the neurotic personality type category possess the tendency to suffer anxiety more
often [64]. Powers are potentials to do specific things but not others. For example, the
human body has a wide, but not limitless, range of movement [65].
Critical realist reality is an open system where causation can be generalizable, but only
within contexts that provide conditions for enabling causation. For example, psychomotor
rehabilitation treatment can be carried out within different organizational structures, such
as building arrangements, and personnel roles, and within different organizational cultures,
such as dress code and communication style. However, if organizational structure and
organizational culture for psychomotor rehabilitation are the same for all rehabilitation
treatments, such as physiotherapy, then different psychomotor experiences from the same
treatment are likely to arise from different generative causal mechanisms.
Notably, critical realism provides a generalizable causal framing for the same actions
in the same context, such as the same environmental niche, leading to different experiences.
This is different to positivistic laws of causation. It is also different to the anti-positive
view that an action can lead to diverse outcomes that are too individually subjective to
be generalized. However, unlike anti-positivism, the critical realist explanation is not
antagonistic toward those starting from a positivistic perspective. This is because, in
common with positivism, critical realism holds that it is possible to construct knowledge
that, to some extent, represents or mirrors reality as it objectively exists. At the same time,
unlike positivism, the critical realism explanation is not antagonistic toward those starting
from an anti-positivistic perspective. This is because, in common with anti-positivism,
critical realism holds that there are no universal mechanisms of causation in human
endeavors. Hence, critical realism can bridge otherwise opposing perspectives [66].
4. Predictive Global Neuronal Workspace Theory (PGNW)
There are many theories of consciousness, each which has its own strengths and
weaknesses [67]. However, the scientific theory of consciousness that is most relevant
to psychomotor predictive processing is predictive global neuronal workspace theory
(PGNW) [11,68,69].
PGNW has several advantages for including psychomotor generative characteristics
in the planning of operation of human–robot systems. In particular, it is has the underlying
simplicity of a widely applicable principle: the free-energy principle (FEP). This is a physics
of life principle, which formalizes embodied cognition of the autopoietic organization of
living things. The FEP formalizes that active systems must occupy a limited repertoire
of internal states through minimizing the long-term average of unwanted surprise from
external states: i.e., from the world [70,71].
For psychomotor experience, a further advantage is that the corollary of FEP applied
within PGNW is active inference by which living things take action in order to survive.
Specifically, in this physics of life process theory, living things, including humans, imple-
ment generative models in order to survive. This involves humans surviving by taking
action to align their internal generative models with external states. Apropos, free energy
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in FEP can be regarded as the information a person is lacking to align her/his internal
generative model with the external state [41]. Hence, if survival depends upon resolving
information gaps between the internal generative model and the external state, then free
energy in FEP can be regarded as the survival information deficit from which unsustainable
unwanted surprise arises. Action to better align the internal generative model with the
external state reduces unwanted surprise by reducing the survival information deficit (i.e.,
by reducing FEP free energy). Better aligning can involve updating the internal generative
model based on current sensory sampling of the external state and current actions taken in
the external state. Alternatively, updating the internal generative model can be based on
the action of changing what sensations are sampled from the external state, and/or can
be based on taking new action in the external state to change sensations from the external
state. For example, changing sampling can involve becoming hypervigilant to a potential
source of pain, and taking new action in the external state to restrict work involving the
potential source of pain. Often, actions will be interrelated, and can be referred to as a
policy, with new priorities for sensory sampling and/or new priorities for actions being a
policy change. Overall, humans survive by reducing prediction errors amidst the complex-
ity of the environmental niches in which they survive [72]. Active inference is relevant to
psychomotor experience in many different practical settings [73].
Another distinction of PGNW is that it has a parsimonious structure, which is very
suitable for tabular representations. Specifically, PGNW comprises three main constructs:
the consistency of top-down prior expectations, strength of bottom-up sensory signals,
and endogenous attention-based modulation. These are constructs that have been found
to be important in separate empirical research by others, for example, in relation to the
experience of pain. Research deploying neuroimaging has found that expectations shape
individuals’ experiences of pain [74], and that attention affects which sensory events are
selected [75]. Notably, as explained in more detail in subsequent sections with further
references, findings from other empirical research also indicate that constructs in PGNW
can be influenced by characteristics such as personality type [76,77].
Importantly, PGNW draws upon one of the most empirically well-supported models
of consciousness: global neuronal workspace [12]. Another advantage is that within critical
realism, causation is generative [62,63] and generative models are at the core of PGNW.
Notably, through its predictive potential, PGNW has potential to contribute to addressing
the psychomotor experience of symptoms without pathophysiological disruption [5,6]: for
example, negative changes in psychomotor functioning that are much larger and more
long-term than can be explained by a potential cause, such as a minor injury.
5. Critical Realist Framing of Psychomotor Experience
Embodied cognition involves mind–body behaviors that are not always brain-
centric [78,79], and can be described as complex psychomotor interactions [80,81]. For
example, our largest sensory organ for interoception, nociception, and proprioception is the
highly innervated fascial system [82,83]. The fascia system can become densified around
our physiological asymmetries, such as one leg being slightly shorter than the other, during
repetitive movement patterns in modern lifestyles [84,85]. This can shape how we walk
(i.e., our gait), which can affect what we remember [86] and influence our personalities [87].
This is an example of mind–body behaviors involving complex psychomotor interactions,
rather than being wholly brain-based. Apropos, the same pain stimuli can be followed by
different people experiencing different pain [88,89].
As summarized in Table 1, nonconscious combinations of personality type, hardiness
level, fascia densification, and body memory can entail generative causal mechanisms
for a low probability of conscious pain experience or high probability of conscious pain
experience. This critical realist generative perspective of pain causation is consistent with
pain matrix theory [90,91].
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Personality type Not prone to pain anxiety Prone to pain anxiety
Hardiness level High Low
Powers
Fascia densification Minor fascia densification Widespread fascia densification
Body memories Fast recovery from local pain Widespread persistent pain
With regard to tendencies, personality type can affect pain experience. For example,
higher neuroticism and lower openness are associated with persistent pain [92]. Alongside
personality type, hardiness is an attribute that allows some individuals to stay healthier
under stress than others [93,94]. Information for the definition of tendencies (what) can be
obtained through other established techniques such as personality type tests and hardiness
measure scales [95]. Information for the definition of current experience (what) can be
obtained through other established techniques such as self-reporting pain scales, physical
examination, and imaging studies.
With regard to powers, the highly innervated fascial system comprises tissues that
connect bones with muscles to enable dynamic functioning [96,97]. However, dynamic
functioning depends upon fascia being able to move fully and smoothly. Densification can
restrict fascial functioning by restricting sliding between fascial tissue interfaces. Densifi-
cation can result from over-repetition of a narrow range of movements [98]. Importantly,
expectations about future pain can be based on body memory of past pain [99–101]. Infor-
mation for the definition of powers can be obtained through established techniques such
as physiological function tests [102] and pain memory questionnaires [103].
As summarized in Table 1, a nonconscious generative causal mechanism for a low
probability of pain experience would be, for example, a person not being prone to pain
anxiety, having a high hardiness, having one minor fascia densification, and body memory
of one fast pain recovery. For such a person, one surprise pain from movement during a
routine narrow range of movements can be experienced due to one minor densification
in the fascial system. Such densification could be reversed through one physical therapy
involving fascia manipulation and small rehabilitation exercise to restore full smooth fascia
functioning [104,105]. This could be followed by a reduced likelihood of further pain as
the range of movement is increased through movement practice and the perception is
improved through reduced densification of the fascia system [106].
By contrast, a generative causal mechanism for a high probability of pain experi-
ence would be, for example, a person being prone to pain anxiety, having low hardiness,
having widespread fascia densification, and having body memory of many persistent
pain experiences. Consider, for example, a prescribed rehabilitation exercise for such a
person. Rehabilitation exercise can be followed by slightly increased pain initially [107].
However, this can have the unintended negative consequence of reducing the range of
movement as the person tries to avoid pain. This rehabilitation exercise outcome can
precipitate learned helplessness and descend into chronic pain conditions with widespread
complex psychomotor symptoms [108–112]. The potential for such negative unintended
consequences may be increased through stress caused by interacting with robotics and
the wearing of hardware such as augmented reality headsets and exoskeletons [10,14].
Accordingly, it is appropriate to include consideration of generative causal mechanisms, as
illustrated in Table 1, during the planning and operation of human–robot systems.
6. Relating PGNW to Critical Realist Framing of Psychomotor Experience
6.1. Overview
As summarized in Table 2, PGNW can be related to an expanded version of the
examples above. Apropos, a human production operative who works with mobile robotics
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while wearing hardware, such as exoskeletons and headsets, may develop a consistent
top-down prior expectation of ankle pain from what was initially a surprise ankle pain early
in a working day. This could have arisen from wearing an exoskeleton having introduced
unpredictable loads to the production operative’s musculoskeletal system while restricting
three-dimensional rotational movements that are typically involved in lifting. Toward the
end of the day, there may be very strong bottom-up sensory signals because the operative
has to do some heavy lifting. If the operative pays attention to the ankle, then it is likely
that the operative will be conscious of ankle pain. However, as the end of the working day
nears, the operative’s attention to ankle pain can be modulated by attention being focused
on leaving work on time so as to be able to keep a social appointment. As a consequence,
the operative may not be conscious of ankle pain at the final stages of the day despite there
being several hours of consistent prior evidence to support ankle pain expectation and
despite strong physical causation for increased ankle pain during heavy lifting [113,114].
Whether conscious or nonconscious of ankle pain at the end of the working day, the
operative may subsequently undergo some minor ankle fascia manipulation therapy and
begin one ankle rehabilitation exercise to widen the range of ankle movement. After a
few days, the ankle may be pain-free and the operative may soon forget about having had
ankle pain.









Specific acute pain only during work
continued briefly after initial pain








Eventually, chronic body-wide pain
throughout daily life irrespective of type
of movement or whether there is
any movement
Eventually, strength of
bottom-up signals is not
directly related to particular




However, the wearing of exoskeletons could have negative effects on fascia system
functioning, such as negative unintended changes to interoception, nociception, and pro-
prioception [9]. Apropos, the next day, the operative’s anxiety about ankle injury could
lead the operative to becoming hypervigilant to any bottom-up sensory signal related
to the ankle. This can involve two attentional processes of hypervigilance: detection of
threatening stimuli and difficulty in disengaging attention from threatening stimuli. In
particular, operatives with high pain-related anxiety are more likely to orient their attention
toward a pain-related threat and have difficulty in disengaging from the threat [115]. Treat-
ment may not end hypervigilance. Rather, treatment can be followed by fear of re-injury
and prevent the return to work [116]. At worst, they can descend into chronic fear of
pain from movement (i.e., kinesiophobia) and chronic pain conditions with widespread
complex symptoms, such as fibromyalgia [117]. Thus, formulation of the prior expectation
of acute ankle-specific pain during one working day can expand into a consistent prior
expectation of chronic body-wide pain. Here, it is important to note chronic body-wide
pain is prevalent amongst many populations throughout the world [118].
6.2. Consistency of Top-Down Prior Expectations
During the evolution of our psychomotor systems, humans were hunter-gatherers
who could develop consistent prior expectations as they moved on foot through natural
environments in order to survive [119]. The change from hunter-gathering to agricultural
settlement began the transition away from natural lifestyles [120] and toward a disconnect
between psychomotor movement and human survival. This has brought a fundamental
change in prior expectations. In particular, hunter-gathers have the prior expectation that
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survival depends upon moving with the wide repertoire of full-body motions involved in
hunting and gathering. By contrast, the majority of humans in 2021 are not involved in
the daily psychomotor motions involved in hunting and gathering. Rather, the majority
of humans can have the consistent prior expectation that survival will not depend upon
undertaking a wide repertoire of daily full-body motions [121]. There is evidence that
humans become conscious of the pain that they are expecting to experience [89]. Yet, having
expectations of pain from movement alongside no expectation of having to move in order
to survive is a fundamentally different combination of expectations compared to when the
human psychomotor system evolved. This disconnect between movement and survival
can be addressed through psychomotor rehabilitation to increase movement. However,
the compositions of prior expectations related to psychomotor pain are very difficult to
define and to address [122,123], not least because of the lack of understanding of how body
memory functions [124,125]. Meanwhile, the world’s remaining hunter-gatherers continue
to have better health than much of the rest of humanity [126].
6.3. Strength of Bottom-Up Sensory Signals
If there is a strong pain signal from a strong blow, there can be a close match between
the point of contact and location of short-term pain. By contrast, in phenomena such as
complex regional pain syndrome (CRPS), there can be widespread pain disproportionate
in severity and time to the original source of pain. This can involve extreme pain, swelling,
reduced motion range, changes to skin, and changes to bones. CRPS can start in one limb
but spread throughout the body [127]. CRPS pain is an example of diffuse pain, which is
not fully understood by medical science [128]. In addition to phenomena within which
pain signals are not connected to an initial pain source and pain signals being diffuse, pain
signals can also be unpredictable [129].
Yet, even a very strong bottom-up psychomotor signal does not necessarily lead to
pain. For example, in the zone of a psychomotor flow state [130,131], a boxer may not be
conscious of pain from punches. This is epitomized by the words of the famously successful
boxer, who went 91 bouts undefeated between 1943 and 1951, Sugar Ray Robinson: “You
don’t think. It is all instinct. If you stop to think, you’re gone” [132]. Hence, he was in the
zone of flow states long before sports psychology formalized them in scientific research
and coaching practice [133]. More generally, repeated strong sensory signals, for example,
in contact sports, can contribute to the same pain stimuli involving lower pain [134]. Thus,
pain signals are different to audio signals and visual signals, which have been previously
addressed in PGNW research, that are directly related to sources, that are specific, that are
predictable, and that are not overridden by flow states [68,135].
6.4. Endogenous Attention-Based Modulation
With regard to attention and awareness, within PGNW, the more likely a top-down
prior expectation is to predict a bottom-up sensory signal (i.e., the higher the prior probabil-
ity), the more attention will be paid to the prior expectation and the more influence the prior
expectation will have on what is experienced. By contrast, the lower the prior probability,
the more attention will be paid to the bottom-up sensory signal and any prediction error
between prior expectation and what is actually experienced. Thus, the predictive in predic-
tive global neuronal workspace (PGNW) draws upon active inference: a corollary of the
free-energy principle (FEP) according to which a self-organizing system will maintain itself
by staying within a narrow range of states consistent with its survival. This involves all
self-organizing systems, including humans, needing to minimize unwanted surprise from
prediction errors [67]. However, the modern disconnect between psychomotor movement
and survival leads to disconnects between minimizing unwanted surprise and survival.
For example, as discussed above, fear of pain surprise can contribute to persistent extreme
attention to pain and minimizing movement to avoid pain, thus acting against the survival
imperative for psychomotor movement [136,137].
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Within PGNW, conscious awareness should be continuous with an inferential hierar-
chy involving nonconscious processing. This entails the stability of conscious representa-
tions by superordinate representations being synchronized with subordinate representa-
tions. For example, conscious superordinate representation of a tool box is synchronized
with subordinate representations of the surfaces, edges, and colors of the tool box. In turn,
a superordinate model of a tool box can be embedded into scenes, such as a work site, in
order to generate predictions about the ways that the tool box will be moved by a fork lift
truck. Synchronous subordinate representation is needed to prevent loss of precision in
representation of the tool box as it is moved [138]. However, unlike hierarchical PGNW
models, psychomotor experience does not necessarily arise from temporally synchronous
hierarchies. For example, the fascia system comprises complex matrices with indeterminate
shifting boundaries rather than a stable hierarchy [139]. Moreover, psychomotor pain arises
through complex interactions between, for example, personality type, hardiness levels,
fascia, and body memory, which do not take place in synchronized hierarchies [140]. For
example, psychomotor action can take place during nocturnal scratching of dermatitis
while sleeping [141].
6.5. Expectations, Signals, Attention, and Human–Robot Systems
Human interactions with robots involve top-down prior expectations, the strength
of bottom-up sensory signals, and endogenous attention-based modulation. Depending
upon the human’s nonconscious generative mechanism, the influence of human–robot
interaction can be more likely to have a positive effect on human psychomotor experience
or be more likely to have a negative effect on human psychomotor experience. For example,
design engineers and computer scientists who develop human–robot systems need to
take into account that human top-down expectations can be negative. Moreover, negative
expectations can contribute to negative human perception of bottom-up signals and neg-
ative human endogenous attention-based modulation, which, in turn, can contribute to
negative consequences for psychomotor predictive processing. Furthermore, those who
operate and manage human–robot systems need to take into account that stress and anxiety
from human–robot interactions have the potential to contribute to long-term disorders
of consciousness, for example, the experience of chronic symptoms without pathophys-
iological disruption [5,6,39,40]. Here, it is important to note that once individuals get
“stuck” in chronic symptoms, it can take very long-term interventions to get “unstuck” [41].
Accordingly, the planning and the operation need to take into account different human
nonconscious generative mechanisms (critical realist-why) and how these can provide
the underlying basis for many activity-specific human generative models (PGNW-how)
related to a wide variety of human interactions with robots, and with hardware such as
augmented reality headsets and wearable exoskeletons.
7. Psychomotor Hierarchical Predictive Processing
7.1. Overview
The introduction of critical realist framing for nonconscious generative causation
provides a unifying explanatory basis for activity-specific generative models that are
focused on reducing prediction errors related to particular activities. For example, a human
worker may have particular generative models for getting ready to travel to work, for
travelling to work, for doing work, and so on. By contrast, as summarized in Table 1,
critical realist generative causal mechanisms are not focused directly on prediction error
reduction in particular individual activities. Rather, they can underlie all of a person’s
activity-specific generative models. Accordingly, as summarized in Figure 1, they can be
considered meta-generative models that are consistent with theoretical constructs such
as self-models [79,142,143] and hierarchical predictive processing [41,42,144]. These are
meta-generative models of individuals’ own psychomotor lives in the world as the world
is experienced by those individuals. In other words, they are subjective autopoietic meta-
generative models of world/self. Such meta-generative models can provide an explanatory
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basis for practitioners, such as design engineers and computer scientists, about why some
people can suffer the descent into chronic ill health without pathophysiological disruption.
For example, as summarized in Figure 1b, consistently strong top-down prior expectations
of pain, which override bottom-up sensory inputs, can come from a generative causal
mechanism/meta-generative model comprising a combination of personality type prone
to pain anxiety, low hardiness, widespread major fascia densification, and adverse body
memories. Accordingly, design engineers and computer scientists should develop human–
robot systems to minimize the potential for increasing human stress. In particular, human–
robot systems should be developed to maintain balance between the meta-generative
model and sensory inputs shown in Figure 1a.
Figure 1. Critical realist generative causal mechanism as a meta-generative model in hierarchical predictive processing:
(a) in balance with sensory inputs; (b) determines attention, expectation, and action irrespective of sensory inputs.
7.2. Challenges
Even with a critical realist framing, there are challenges for the application of modeling
methods used in previous PGNW studies during the planning and operation of human–
robot systems. For example, methodologies for defining personality type, hardiness levels,
fascia densification, and body memory can contribute to approximate descriptions with
indeterminate boundaries, such as those between one personality type category and an-
other [145]. Moreover, fascia research is at an early stage [146]. Hence, it is as yet unclear
exactly how fascia densification affects interoception, nociception, proprioception, and
exteroception. In addition, relationships between body memory and fascia are topics
of scientific research that are at a very early stage. Accordingly, the influence of fascia
densification and body memory on bottom-up sensory signals is uncertain. With regard to
attention-based modulation, the fascia system comprises complex matrices, rather than
a stable hierarchy, within which the operation of body memory is uncertain. Nonethe-
less, critical realist PGNW already has potential for incorporation into the planning and
operation of human–robot systems.
7.3. Opportunities in Planning Human–Robot Systems
With regard to planning, as shown by Table 2 and Figure 2, critical realist PGNW
has the characteristic of good scientific theories and of engineering design methods: parsi-
mony [147]. In particular, critical realist PGNW is parsimonious in its definition of main
constructs and interactions between them. For example, a main proposition is that con-
sciousness is most likely to occur when there is alignment between consistent top-down
prior expectations, strong bottom-up sensory signals, and endogenous attention-based
modulation. As summarized in Table 2, this fundamental proposition is applicable to
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the critical realist framing of psychomotor experience and is a useful starting point for
setting-out nuances, divergences, and their consequences.
Figure 2. Critical realist PNGW why, how, and what.
For example, within psychomotor experience, as explained above, there is no need for
pain signals to be strong in order for there to be strong pain. Rather, hypervigilance to the
fear of pain can contribute to descent into debilitating diffuse body-wide pain. Conversely,
strong pain signals do not necessarily lead to strong pain. Rather, there are situations where
people pay little, if any, attention to strong pain signals, for example, when in the zone
of flow states. Moreover, the modern disconnect between psychomotor movement and
survival subverts assumptions that minimizing unwanted surprise will facilitate survival.
On the contrary, as explained above, minimizing unwanted pain surprise through avoiding
movement can contribute to chronic widespread pain and many serious health problems.
Accordingly, tabular summaries of critical realist PGNW can be used to highlight these
issues in conjunction with established engineering design methods such as failure mode
and effects analysis (FMEA) and job design. FMEA provides a systematic process for
predicting and preventing problems [148], while job design methods are used to facilitate
both workplace performance and worker wellbeing [149].
Here, it is important to note that human participation in human–robot systems is not
limited to those who operate the systems. Rather, they can involve human end-users who
may already be facing psychomotor challenges, such as elderly residents in care homes that
deploy robotics to assist human carers. Thus, critical realist PGNW could be included in
service design [150] that takes into account the psychomotor characteristics of human-robot
systems’ end-users such as care home residents.
7.4. Opportunities in Operating Human–Robot Systems
With regard to the operation of human–robot systems, critical realist PGNW can be
useful in neuroscience education for successful psychomotor experiences and for address-
ing poor psychomotor experiences [151]. This can include using critical realist PGNW
as a basis for calibrating expectations [152] by relating possible actions to different non-
conscious generative causal mechanisms, for example, as summarized in Tables 1 and 2.
This can better enable explanations to be accepted, for example, by reconciling personal
goals with personal characteristics [153]. This can minimize what has been described as the
expectation–actuality discrepancy (i.e., prediction error) and thus increase the likelihood of
satisfaction [154] through the definition of attainable states [41]. In particular, the definition
of attainable states [41] can reduce negative consequences from expectations being set
either too high or too low [155].
For explanation by humans, no major additions to the current best practice are required
for critical realist PGNW to support neuroscience education for practitioners. The design
Entropy 2021, 23, 806 12 of 19
of critical realist PGNW information and its communication should be based on the best
practice [156–158] to enable accessibility to the individual and all those who can support
the individual in progressing, for example, toward psychomotor pain reduction [153,154].
For explanation by artificial intelligence (AI), critical realist PGNW descriptions are well-
suited to the current third phase in the development of AI. Specifically, a third phase
that aims to combine the knowledge-guided top-down basis of its first phase with the
data-driven bottom-up basis of its second phase [159,160]. This hybrid AI is not monolithic
but is open to top-down rules-based software from different vendors and data-driven
bottom-up software from other vendors. For example, critical realist PGNW constructs and
interactions between them could be maintained in top-down standardized templates in
one software, and details of individuals’ characteristics could be bottom-up inputs from
many other software packages. Importantly for human accessibility, it may be possible
for both top-down rules and bottom-up inputs to be human-readable [161]. This can be
important to both operatives and end-users in human–robot systems.
8. Conclusions
The purpose of this paper is to expand the scope of predictive processing in three
ways. First, by going beyond previous predictive processing studies that have encom-
passed embodied cognition but have not addressed fundamental aspects of psychomotor
functioning [162]. As summarized in Table 1, this has been carried out by providing pre-
liminary analyses of interrelationships between personality type, hardiness levels, fascia
system, and body memory. Second, the scope of predictive processing has been expanded
by proposing a scientific basis for explaining predictive processing that spans objective
neuroscience and subjective experience. This has been carried out by explaining how
critical realism addresses the comparative limitations of positivism and anti-positivism,
while providing a bridge between them. Furthermore, as summarized in Table 1, it has
been explained that critical realism is inherently aligned with predictive processing through
its emphasis on the generative nature of causation. Third, the scope of predictive pro-
cessing has been expanded by providing an explanation of predictive processing that can
be incorporated into the planning and operation of systems involving robots and other
new technologies. This has been carried out through the practical analysis summarized in
Table 2, Figures 1 and 2, which are typical of the tabular formats and simple diagrams that
are widely used in engineering design [48].
As summarized in Figure 1, the primary contribution of the paper was the intro-
duction of a new formulation of hierarchical predictive processing, which is focused on
psychomotor functioning. This formulation is not in competition with extant theoretical
formulations, which have also been based on reviews of previous empirical research and
encompass hierarchical predictive processing [41,79,163,164]. Rather, it is complementary
to extant theoretical formulations encompassing hierarchical predictive processing, but
which are not focused on psychomotor experience. Furthermore, the primary contribution
of this paper is relevant to various theoretical formulations concerned with embodied,
embedded, enacted, and extended cognition (4E) [165], which involve, but have not ad-
dressed, fundamental aspects of psychomotor functioning that are included in this paper.
4E cognition assumes that cognition is shaped by dynamic interactions between the brain,
body physical environment, and social environment. Yet, previously, 4E studies in the
literature have not encompassed interactions between personality type, hardiness lev-
els, fascia system, and body memory, nor have they provided a structuring of the why,
how, and what of psychomotor experience that can inform the planning and operation
of human–robot systems. This is important because 4E cognition faces new challenges
from interacting with robotics and wearing new technologies such as augmented reality
headsets and exoskeletons.
A further important contribution was the outline of challenges for the application of
modeling methods used in previous PGNW studies. In Table 3, a summary is provided of
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directions for further research to advance the understanding of psychomotor predictive
processing, and its consideration in the planning and operation of human–robot systems.
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Meanwhile, there are already many potential future directions for applying critical
realist PGNW. These include furthering predictive processing research into skilful psy-
chomotor performance in general [166] and specific phenomena in skilful psychomotor
performance such as kinaesthetic motor imagery [167]. Such research can inform efforts to
design and maintain systems that facilitate the balance between top-down expectations and
bottom-up sensory inputs, as summarized in Figure 1a. With regard to Figure 1b, future
research could also include addressing the psychomotor experience of symptoms without
pathophysiological disruption and the psychomotor experience of relief after the adminis-
tration of placebo treatments [6]. Such research could include how human nonconscious
and conscious beliefs about robots and other technologies affect workplace performance
and personal health. Furthermore, relating predictions framed in terms of critical realist
PGNW to subsequent rich descriptions of what has been experienced [168] can provide
wider and deeper insights that can be informative for all scientists and practitioners with
interest in predictive processing.
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